MEIN KAMPF Dual English-German Edition (vol.2)
Mein Kampf is the autobiography and articulated worldview of one of the most consequential men in history. It is also one of the most maligned and least understood texts of the 20th century. There have been so many obfuscations, deceptions, and outright falsehoods circulated about this work, that one scarcely knows where to begin. Written in the mid-1920s when Hitler was still a relative unknown, this book has never had an adequate English translation. With minor exception, all British or American publishers were inherently biased against the author and his ideas. They had no real interest in producing a clear and accurate translation; in fact, just the opposite—they were anxious to portray the ideas as jumbled, incoherent, and even insane. The reality is very different than this. Hitler offers a clear and coherent account of history and his own worldview. His ideas resonate to the present day. The work is presented here complete, unedited, and for the first time ever, in dual German-English translation. This is useful for both scholars and laymen alike. It allows the reader to check the veracity and completeness of the translation, and it encourages him to examine the subtleties associated with the German language. Mein Kampf is one man’s assessment of history and vision for the future. It is blunt; it is harsh; it is unapologetic. It does not comply with contemporary standards of politeness, objectivity, and political correctness. It sounds offensive to sensitive modern ears. But the book is undeniably important. It is more consequential than perhaps any other political work in history. It deserves to be read, in a clear and unbiased translation. And each reader will then be free to determine its ultimate value and meaning for themselves. 614 pages TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. WORLDVIEW AND PARTY 1.1 Bourgeois ‘Program Committees’ 1.2 Marxism and Democratic Principles 1.3 Worldview Against Worldview 1.4 The ‘Folkish’ Concept 1.5 From Religious Feelings to Dogmatic Belief 1.6 Marxism versus Race and Personality 1.7 Organization of a Party 2. THE STATE 2.1 Three Leading Conceptions of the State 2.2 False Conceptions of ‘Germanization’ 2.3 The State is Not an End in Itself 2.4 The National Socialist Conception of the State 2.5 Criteria for the Evaluation of a State 2.6 Consequences of our Racial Division 2.7 The State—A Weapon in the Life-Struggle 2.8 World History is Made by the Few 2.9 Dangers of Racial Mixing 2.10 The Folkish State and Racial Hygiene 2.11 Educational Principles of the Folkish State 2.12 Supervision Between School- and Military-Age 2.13 Training in Secrecy 2.14 Joy in Responsibility 2.15 No Overloading of the Brain 2.16 General Education—Specialized Education 2.17 The Value of Humanistic Education 2.18 Prevailing ‘Patriotic’ Education 2.19 Awakening of National Pride 2.20 Instilling a Sense of Race 2.21 State Selection of the Fit 2.22 Evaluation of Work 2.23 Ideal and Reality 3. SUBJECTS AND CITIZENS 3.1 Citizens—Subjects—Foreigners 3.2 The Citizen as Master of the Reich 4. PERSONALITY AND THE FOLKISH STATE-CONCEPT 4.1 Building on an Aristocratic Principle 4.2 Personality and Cultural Progress 4.3 Marxism Negates the Value of Personality 4.4 The Best Form of State 4.5 National Socialism and the Coming State 5. WORLDVIEW AND ORGANIZATION 5.1 Struggle and Criticism 5.2 Community as Basis for a New Worldview 5.3 Leadership and Following 5.4 Guiding Principles of the Movement 5.5 National Socialism and the Folkish Idea 6. STRUGGLE IN EARLY TIMES: SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SPOKEN WORD 6.1 Fight against Poisonous Propaganda 6.2 Against the Tide 6.3 Politics of the Wide View 6.4 Enlightenment about the Peace Treaties 6.5 Speech More Effective than Writing 6.6 Marxism’s Success through Speech 6.7 Psychological Conditions of Effective Speech 6.8 Bethmann and Lloyd George as Speakers 6.9 Necessity of Mass Meetings 7. CONFLICT WITH THE RED FRONT 7.1 Bourgeois ‘Mass Meetings’ 7.2 Despicable Red Posters 7.3 Vacillating Tactics of the Marxists 7.4 Illegal Police Activity 7.5 Psychologically Correct Meeting Management 7.6 Marxist and Bourgeois Meeting Techniques 7.7 National Socialist Security Troop 7.8 Old and New Black-Red-Gold 7.9 The National Socialist Flag 7.10 First Meeting in the Circus 7.11 An Attempted Disruption 8. THE STRONG MAN IS MIGHTIEST ALONE 8.1 A Movement’s Right of Priority 8.2 The Struggle for Leadership 8.3 Austria and Prussia 8.4 Causes of Folkish Splintering 8.5 ‘Working Federations’ 9. BASIC IDEAS REGARDING THE MEANING AND ORGANIZATION OF THE S.A. 9.1 Three Bases of Authority 9.2 Three Classes of National Bodies 9.3 Sacrifice of the Best 9.4 The Resulting Disorganization 9.5 Deserters and Revolution 9.6 Collaboration of the Leftist Parties 9.7 Capitulation of the Bourgeoisie 9.8 Why did the Revolution Succeed? 9.9 Capitulation to Marxism 9.10 No Fighting Power without an Idea 9.11 Advocacy of the Folkish Idea 9.12 Necessity of Defense Troops 9.13 Why no Defense Leagues? 9.14 No Secret Organizations 9.15 Training of the SA 9.16 First March in Munich 9.17 March at Coburg 9.18 The SA Succeeds as a Fighting Organization 9.19 The End of 1923 9.20 The New SA of 1925 10. THE MASK OF FEDERALISM 10.1 Anti-Prussian Hatred as Diversionary Maneuver 10.2 Kurt Eisner, ‘Bavarian Particularist’ 10.3 My Struggle against Anti-Prussian Hatred 10.4 ‘Federative Activity’ 10.5 Jewish Incitement Activity 10.6 Denominational Discord 10.7 Federalized or Centralized State? 10.8 The Policy of Redemption 10.9 National State or Slave Colony? 10.10 Unifying Tendencies 10.11 Abuse of Centralization 10.12 Cultural Tasks of the States 10.13 One People—One State 11. PROPAGANDA AND ORGANIZATION 11.1 Theoretician—Organizer—Agitator 11.2 Propaganda and Organization 11.3 Limitation of Membership 11.4 Frightening the Faint-Hearted 11.5 Reorganization of the Movement 11.6 Responsibility of the Leader 11.7 Building the Movement 12. THE TRADE UNION QUESTION 12.1 Are Trade Unions Necessary? 12.2 National Socialist Unions? 12.3 No Dual Unions 12.4 Battle of Worldviews Comes First 12.5 Better No Foundation than a Failed One 13. GERMAN POST-WAR ALLIANCE POLICY 13.1 Reasons for the Breakdown 13.2 Aim of Foreign Policy: Freedom Tomorrow 13.3 Pre-condition for the Liberation of Lost Regions 13.4 Mistaken Continental Policy before the War 13.5 Present European Power Relations: England and Germany 13.6 England’s War Aim Not Achieved 13.7 Political Goals of France and England 13.8 Alliance Possibilities for Germany 13.9 Is Germany Capable of Alliance Today? 13.10 Divergence Between British and Jewish Interests 13.11 Jewish World Incitement Against Germany 13.12 Pandering to France 13.13 The South Tyrol Question 13.14 Who Betrayed South Tyrol? 13.15 Three Questions on an Alliance Policy 13.16 Neglected Exploitation of the Versailles Treaty 13.17 Inversion of Anti-German Psychosis 13.18 Concentration on One Enemy 13.19 Reckoning with the Traitors 13.20 Fascist Italy and Jewry 13.21 England and Jewry 13.22 Japan and Jewry 13.23 Our Fight Against the World-Enemy 14. GERMANY’S POLICY IN EASTERN EUROPE 14.1 Prejudice in Questions of Foreign Policy 14.2 Significance of the State’s Area 14.3 French and German Colonial Policy 14.4 The Historical Mission of National Socialism 14.5 Enduring Fruits of a Millennial Policy 14.6 A Call for the Old Borders 14.7 No Sentimentality in Foreign Policy 14.8 Resumption of Eastern Policy 14.9 Bismarck’s Russia Policy 14.10 The ‘League of Oppressed Nations’ 14.11 Is England’s Rule in India Tottering? 14.12 German Alliance with Russia? 14.13 Germany and Russia Before the War 14.14 The German-English-Italian Alliance 14.15 Conditions for Eastern Policy 14.16 The Foreign Policy Stamp of National Socialism 15. THE RIGHT TO EMERGENCY DEFENSE 15.1 Cowardly Submission Brings No Mercy 15.2 Seven Years to 1813—Seven Years to Locarno 15.3 France’s Inevitable Political Goals 15.4 Occupation of the Ruhr 15.5 What Should Have Been Done After the Ruhr Occupation? 15.6 Failure to Reckon with Marxism 15.7 Cuno’s Way 15.8 Passive Resistance 15.9 November 1923 CONCLUSION